United States v. Figueroa, no. 10-2050-cr (May 26, 2011) (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1). Where the defendant is charged with possessing a controlled substance not specifically referenced in the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 calls for a marijuana equivalency to be calculated using the most closely related listed substance. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, district court’s reliance on the fact that BZP (Benzylpiperazine) and MDMA (Methylenedioxymethamphetamine) are interchangeable on the streets is not enough to support a conclusion that MDMA is the appropriate substitute for BZP alone under § 2D1.1. Remand for an evidentiary hearing was the appropriate course of action.
United States v. Spencer, no. 10-1869-cr (May 20, 2011) (supervised release). District courts retain power to adjudicate supervised release violations even after the expiration of the term of supervised release so long as the warrant or summons was issued before the expiration date. Due process requires that supervised release conditions “be sufficiently clear to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”
Watson v. Greene, no. 10-307-pr (May 17, 2011) (Confrontation clause; habeas). Although state court did not expressly provide grounds for denial of defendant’s request to cross examine prosecution witness regarding document, the Second Circuit could readily infer reasonable grounds for the exclusion of the document that would not have amounted to unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Word v. Lord, no. 11-111-op (May 13, 2011) (habeas, successive petitions). Because the Constitution does not require that states provide post-conviction proceedings as an avenue for relief, a habeas proceeding is not the appropriate venue for claims regarding mistakes made in state post-conviction proceedings.
Wood v. Ercole, no. 09-2905-pr (May 4, 2011).
United States v. Persico, no. 08-5266-cr et al (May 3, 2011).
United States v. Cedeno, no. 09-1857-cr et al (May 2, 2011) (F.R.E. 608). District court’s inquiry as to whether evidence of a prior (adverse) determination as to witness’s truthfulness was too narrow where it was limited to whether the prior judicial finding addressed the witness's veracity in that specific case or generally and whether the two sets of testimony involved similar subject matter. Instead, the district court should have considered other factors affecting the probity and relevancy such as:
(1) whether the lie was under oath in a judicial proceeding or was made in a less formal context; (2) whether the lie was about a matter that was significant; (3) how much time had elapsed since the lie was told and whether there had been any intervening credibility determination regarding the witness; (4) the apparent motive for the lie and whether a similar motive existed in the current proceeding; and (5) whether the witness offered an explanation for the lie and, if so, whether the explanation was plausible.
The district court’s error, however, was harmless and the Second Circuit affirmed.
